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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we investigate the link between the real foreign exchange
value of the dollar and real interest rates since 1979. We argue that it
is important to consider the possibility that real exchange rate
movements reflect movements of the long-run equilibrium exchange rate as
well as real interest differentials. We use a state-space approach to
estimate the importance of shifts in the long-run equilibrium exchange
rate, the persistence of the ex ante short-term real interest
differential, and the effect of this differential on the exchange rate.
Using U.S., Canadian, British, German and Japanese data from October 1979
to March 1986, we find that movements in the dollar real exchange rate
have been dominated by unanticipated shifts in the expected long-run real
exchange rate. Ex ante real interest differentials have not been
persistent or variable enough to account for a major part of exchange
rate variation. We use Mussa's (1984) rational expectations model of the
real exchange rate and the current account to interpret our results.
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1. Introduction
The substantial, sustained real appreciation of the dollar during the
first half of the 1980's and its subsequent depreciation since February
1985 are perhaps the most debated and discussed macroeconomic events of
this decade. According to one influential view (as put forth by Blinder
(1986), Branson (1985), Frankel (1985), and Sachs (1985)), the strong
dollar of 1980 through early 1985 was the result of a significant shift
in the U.S. policy mix toward persistent structural budget deficits and a
credible, anti-inflationary monetary stance on the part of the Federal
Reserve. Other authors (Obstfeld (1985), Poole (1985), the Council of
Economic Advisers (1985,1986)) have linked the real appreciation of the
dollar in the years following the 1981-82 recession to the surprising
surge in real business fixed investment spending. Still another
hypothesis (which has been explored by Frankel (1985)) is that the rise
and fall of the dollar resulted from a speculative bubble in the foreign
exchange market.
The real appreciation of the dollar in 1980-1985 coincided with a
marked increase in short and long term real interest rates, particularly
in the U.S. but also abroad (Blanchard and Summers (1984)). This led to
the view, especially popular in the financial press, that "the dollar is
strong because U.S. real interest rates are high." Of course, to the
extent that a shift in monetary policy was responsible for high real
1interest rates in the U.S. relative to those elsewhere, theory would
predict a real appreciation of the dollar -withovershooting -followed
by a real depreciation to offset high U.S. real interest rates. However,
the dollar consistently appreciated in real terms from 1980 through
February 1985. This fact, along with the observation that the slowdown
in U.S. money growth over the 1980-1984 period was in fact moderate
compared with that experienced in Japan, Germany, and the United Kingdom,
has directed research towards explanations of the sustained real
appreciation of the dollar which emphasize real rather than purely
monetary factors.
Since February 1985, the dollar has depreciated substantially in both
nominal and real terms against the currencies of the other G5 countries.
The extent of depreciation against the currencies of other major U.S.
trading partners -Canada,the Latin American countries, and the NIC's in
particular -hasbeen less pronounced, especially in real terms. During
this period, there has been a sustained increase in U.S. money growth, a
decline in GNP growth, the announcement in September 1985 of an effort by
the G5 central banks to bring down the value of the dollar, and
Congressional deliberation of a major reform of the tax code. In
addition, passage of the Gramm-Rudman legislation in December 1985
committed Congress and the President to a budgetary process which would
achieve a balanced Federal budget by Fiscal 1991. Against this backdrop,
both long and short term interest rates have declined sharply in the U.S.
and abroad, as has the the slope of the U.S. term structure.
In this paper, we investigate the link between the real foreign
exchange value of the dollar and real interest rates since 1979. We ask
2how much movement in real exchange rates can be attributed to real
interest differentials, and how much is due to shifts in the long-run
equilibrium real exchange rate.
We begin in Section 2 by analyzing the responses of the real exchange
rate, the real interest differential and the long-run equilibrium real
exchange rate when there is a shock to autonomous expenditure on domestic
goods. As discussed above, this type of shock -inprivate investment or
perhaps government spending -isone possible explanation of the high
dollar in the early 1980's. We show that under certain circumstances, a
permanent positive shock to spending on domestic goods can lead to a
higher real interest rate at home (a negative real interest differential)
in the short run, and a real appreciation (a decrease in the real
exchange rate, the relative price of imports) in both the short and long
run. The shock also generates current account deficits in the short run.
Our analysis is important for two reasons. First, it clarifies theway
in which spending shocks might account for the experience of the early
1980's. Secondly, the claim is sometimes made that an autonomous
increase in spending which, in the short run, worsens the current account
must of necessity lead to a long-run real depreciation which generates
the trade surpluses required to service the accumulated stock of net
foreign debt. Our analysis shows, contrary to this, that the long-run
equilibrium exchange rate can move in the same direction as the current
exchange rate when there is a spending shock.
In Section 3 we discuss the traditional methodology for identifying
movements in the long-run equilibrium exchange rate. In general, the
difference between the log level of the real exchange rate and its
3expected long-run value depends upon the expected sum of current and all
future short-term real interest differentials as well as a risk premium.
This relationship is of sufficient generality that it is virtually devoid
of empirical content. In particular, in the absence of restrictions on
the expected long-run equilibrium real exchange rate and the time series
properties of the real interest differential and the risk premium, there
is no simple link between the level of the real exchange rate and the ex
ante real interest differential.
The traditional approach (taken by Frankel (1985), Shafer and Loopesko
(1983) and Sachs (1985)) is to assume that the expectations hypothesis of
the term-structure holds, and that the cross-currency risk premium is
zero. These restrictions imply that the difference between the log of
the real exchange rate and its expected long-run level is proportional to
the ex ante long-term real interest rate differential. Of course this
differential is unobservable, and must be constructed using the long-
term nominal differential and a proxy for the expected long-term
inflation differential.
The problem with this is that it is hard to measure expected long-term
inflation rates. We provide evidence that widely cited estimates of the
differential between the ex ante long-term real interest rate in the U.S.
and the other G7 countries as of February 1985 (the month in which the
real value of the dollar peaked) may substantially overstate the absolute
value of the true real differential as of that date. If this is true,
the estimates understate the extent of long-run equilibrium dollar
appreciation.
In Section 4 we propose an alternative approach to the problem. We
4develop an econometric framework which can be used to estimate the effect
of the ex ante short-term real interest differential on the exchange
rate, and the extent to which real exchange rate changes reflect shifts
in the expected long-run equilibrium real exchange rate. The framework
also provides an estimate of the correlation between innovations in the
ex ante real interest differential and the expected long-run exchange
rate, and allows for the presence of a time varying risk premium.
Our approach may be described as follows. The ex ante short-term real
interest differential is unobservable as is the expected long-run real
exchange rate. However, the ex post short-term real differential and the
current log level of the real exchange rate are observable. We assume
that the ex ante short-term real differential is AR(l). This implies
that the difference between the current log level of the real exchange
rate and its expected long-run level is proportional to the ex ante
short-term real interest differential. We also assume that the long-run
real exchange rate follows a random walk.
With these assumptions, it is possible to estimate a state-space model
in which two observable variables, the log level of the real exchange
rate and the ex post short-term real interest differential, are an exact
linear combination of the unobservable state variables, the ex ante real
differential, the expected long-run real exchange rate, and the error in
forecasting inflation differentials.
The advantage of such a tightly restricted system is that it provides
efficient estimates of the minimum set of parameters required to estimate
the extent to which fluctuations in the (observable) real exchange rate
mirror fluctuations in the (unobservable) ex ante real interest
5differential as opposed to shifts in the (unobservable) expected long-run
real exchange rate. By using the short-term real differential we avoid
the problem of employing proxies for long-run inflation expectations.
The parameter estimates take account of the sampling error associated
with estimating the ex ante differential from the ex post differential,
and allow for covariance between shifts in the expected long-run real
exchange rate and innovations in the ex ante differential.
Our basic findings, presented in detail in Section 5, are easily
summarized: since 1980, movements in the dollar real exchange rate have
been dominated by unanticipated shifts in the expected long-run dollar
exchange rate. Ex ante real interest differentials have simply not been
persistent enough, and their innovation variance simply not large enough,
to account for a substantial fraction of the variation in the dollar real
exchange rate over this period.
We also find that the covarjance between innovations in real interest
differentials and in the long run equilibrium exchange rate has been
positive in the 1979-86 period. That is, shocks which have increased
real interest rates in the U.S. relative to foreign countries have also
appreciated the long-run equilibrium real exchange rate and the current
real exchange rate. This is precisely the pattern that we model
theoretically in Section 2.
In Section 6 we relate our results to other recent empirical research
on real exchange rates and interest rates, and we discuss current
conjectures about the sources of the real dollar depreciation which has
occurred since early 1985.
62. Autonomous Sendinp Shifts and the Long-Run Real Exchange Rate
In the simple textbook Mundell-Flemming world, a permanent autonomous
increase in spending on domestic goods results in a permanent decline in
the relative price of imports (a permanent real appreciation) and a
sustained current account deficit. Current account deficits which result
from autonomous expenditure shifts redistribute wealth away from the
deficit country to the rest of the world. While the Mundell-Flemming
model ignores the effects of this wealth transfer, a number of recent
models of current account and exchange rate dynamics imply that the
decline in domestic wealth reduces domestic absorption relative to
national product, induces a real depreciation with an accompanying real
interest differential, and gradually eliminates the current account
deficit (see Mussa (1984) for a survey and extension of the literature).
It is sometimes claimed that the deterioration of a country's net
foreign asset position resulting from an autonomous increase in spending
requires a long-run real depreciation which more than offsets the initial
real appreciation. The reasoning behind this argument is straight-
forward: the exchange rate must depreciate in real terms relative to its
initial equilibrium to generate the trade-balance surpluses necessary to
service the interest payments on the economy's accumulated stock of net
foreign debt. To evaluate this claim, we investigate the stationary-
state properties of Mussa's (1984) rational expectations model of the
current account and the real exchange rate.
Consider an open economy which produces a fixed quantity of a
tradeable good (the domestic good), consumes the domestic as well as a
foreign good, and trades a single real asset (denominated in foreign
7goods) with the rest of the world. The rate of return on this asset, r,
is assumed constant and the net stock held by domestic residents, a, may
be positive or negative. Foreign residents are willing to exchange
foreign goods for real assets at the prevailing rate of return r, but
their demand for domestic goods in exchange for foreign goods is less
than perfectly elastic with respect to the relative price of foreign
goods in terms of domestic goods, the real exchange rate. Let q denote
the logarithm of the real exchange rate.
Spending on domestic goods by domestic residents depends upon the real
exchange rate, the desired level of total spending on both domestic and
foreign goods by domestic residents, and an autonomous component of total
domestic spending which is assumed to fall exclusively on domestic goods.
The sum of the excess demands of domestic and foreign residents for
domestic goods (in terms of foreign goods) is assumed to be given by
h—s(y-x)+q+x; (1)
where y is the excess of the desired level of total domestic spending on
both domestic and foreign goods over the value of domestically produced
goods (both measured in terms of foreign goods), s is the marginal
expenditure share of total desired domestic spending which falls on
domestic goods, and x is an autonomous component of domestic spending
which falls exclusively on domestic goods.
An increase in the excess of total desired domestic spending over the
value of domestic production increases the excess demand for domestic
goods by the share of such spending, s, which falls on domestic goods in
the absence of exchange rate changes. A rise in q represents a real
exchange rate depreciation (an increase in the relative price of imports)
8which shifts both domestic and foreign spending to domestic goods.
Finally, an increase in autonomous spending on domestic goods, x, leaves
the difference (y -x)unaffected (because desired total spending
increases one for one with autonomous spending) but increases the excess
demand for domestic goods.
In equilibrium, the sum of the excess demands of domestic and foreign
residents for domestic production must equal zero. Setting h0 in
equation (1) and rearranging terms we obtain the following condition for
equilibrium in the market for domestic goods:
y-v(q +(1-s)x); (2)
where v1/s. Equation (2) states that, for any given level of
autonomous spending, an increase in the desired excess of total domestic
spending over the value of domestic product requires a real appreciation
of the domestic currency to restore equilibrium in the market for
domestic goods. Furthermore, as shown in Mussa (1984, p.29), given the
value of y, equilibrium in the domestic goods market implies that the
domestic excess demand for foreign goods is zero.
The determinants of desired total spending by domestic residents are
assumed to be the domestic real interest rate (relative to the world real
interest rate), the stock of net foreign assets, the difference between
net foreign assets and their target level, and an autonomous component.
Specifically, desired saving -thedifference between national income
(including interest income) and total desired spending -isassumed to be
given by
ra-y=(R-r)+u(A-a)-x (3)
where R is the domestic real interest rate, A is the target level of
9assets, and u is a partial adjustment parameter such that 0 <u<1.An
increase in the domestic real interest rate is assumed to increase
desired saving and thus to depress the excess of desired total spending
over the value of national product. Similarly, the larger is the
difference between actual and target assets, the smaller is desired total
spending and the larger is desired saving. Finally, an autonomous
increase in desired spending, x, represents an autonomous decrease in
desired saving and, if x is permanent, an autonomous decrease in the
target level of assets.
The domestic real interest rate depends on the world interest rate, r,
and the expected rate of change of the relative price of foreign goods
E[D(q)J:
R =r+sE[D(q)]; (4)
where D is the forward difference operator. If the relative price of
foreign goods in terms of domestic goods is expected to increase, then an
asset that pays a rate of return r in foreign goods has a rate of return
R in terms of the domestic consumption basket which exceeds r by E[D(q)]
weighted by the marginal expenditure share s devoted to domestic goods.
As a matter of accounting, the current account surplus corresponds to
the rate of accumulation of net foreign assets, and is equal to the
excess of national income (including interest income) over total spending
by domestic residents. Using the equilibrium condition (2) for the
market for domestic product, the accumualtion of net foreign assets can
be written
D(A) =v(q+(1-s)x))+ra. (5)
The current account surplus must also, in equilibrium, equal desired
10saving. Substituting (4) into (3) and equating to (5), we obtain
v((1 -s)x+q)+ra—sE[D(q)]+u(A-a)-x. (6)
Equations (5) and (6) represent a system of forward looking difference
equations which jointly determine the time paths of the real exchange
rate, q, and net foreign assets, a, conditional on the initial stock of
foreign assets and the expected future path of autonomous spending. The
general solution for this model is provided by Mussa, and is investigated
further by Mussa and Frenkel (1985). For the special case in which
shifts in autonomous spending are expected to be permanent (so that x(t)
=E[x(t+j)Jx) a number of concrete results are obtained which we now
summarize.
The first and most basic set of results is that a permanent,
autonomous increase in spending on domestic goods induces a jump real
appreciation, an increase in real interest rates at home relative to
those abroad (a fall in the real interest differential), and a current
account deficit. The increase in home real interest rates dampens, but
does not reverse, the excess of total spending by domestic residents over
national income which is created by the autonomous spending increase.
Similarly, the real appreciation shifts a portion of the excess domestic
spending toward foreign goods as domestic and foreign residents find
foreign substitutes relatively less expensive.
In subsequent periods, the excess of total spending by domestic
residents over national income (the current account deficit) narrows as
the wealth effect of a declining stock of net foreign assets reduces
total domestic spending. As spending falls, the home currency
depreciates; indeed, it is the expectation of this subsequent
11depreciation which induces the initially high level of domestic real
interest rates. A noteworthy feature of the model's rational expectati-
ons equilibrium is that the ex ante real interest differential follows an
AR(l) process, so that the difference between the current log level of
the real exchange rate and its expected long-run equilibrium value is
always proportional to the current one-period ex ante real interest
differential. We examine an empirical specification of this type in
Section 4. Unfortunately, as is so often the case in empirical
macroeconomics, this result does not generalize to more general
specifications for the forcing variables, in this case autonomous
spending.
The rational expectations equilibrium paths for the real exchange
rate, the real interest differential, and the current account converge to
a stationary state in which the real interest differential is zero, the
current account is in balance, and the real exchange rate is constant.
From equation (3) we see that the stationary-state level of net foreign
assets is given by a —A-x/uwhich we shall assume, without any loss of
generality, is negative. In the stationary state, the excess of national
product over desired spending must be sufficient to service the interest
on the accumulated stock of foreign debt. Does this in itself imply that
the home currency must depreciate in the long run by more than the
initial appreciation? The stationary-state condition for a balanced
current account is obtained by substituting a =A-x/uin equation (5)
and setting the right-hand-side to zero:
-r(A -x/u)=v((l-s)x+q). (7)
A bit of algebra reveals that the necessary and sufficient condition for
12a long-run real appreciation in response to a permanent increase in
autonomous spending is
1/s >(1+r/u). (8)
Recall that u is the partial adjustment parameter and that r is the world
real rate of interest. For plausible parameter values, the ratio r/u is
most likely less than 1/4. Thus, a value of s <.8would insure that the
long-run real exchange rate would appreciate in response to a permanent
increase in autonomous spending.
Equation (8) nicely summarizes the two counteracting influences of a
permanent increase in autonomous spending on the long-run real exchange
rate. Autonomous spending which falls on domestic goods requires a real
appreciation which shifts spending away from domestic goods which are in
excess demand. However, permanent increases in autonomous spending can
reverse the country's net foreign asset position to that of a substantial
net debtor. The interest on this debt must be met by an export surplus
which, ceterus paribus, requires a real depreciation which shifts
spending towards domestic goods. Thus, the higher the world real
interest rate and the smaller the rate at which saving adjusts, the
larger is foreign debt and debt service in the stationary-state and the
more likely it is that the real exchange rate must depreciate. However,
so long as the ratio 1/s exceeds 1 +r/u,this effect is outweighed and
the long-run real exchange rate appreciates despite a potentially
substantial accumulation of foreign debt in the stationary state.
For example, suppose that in the initial stationary state autonomous
spending is zero, net foreign assets are positive, and that u.20, r =
.04,and s =.80.Consider now a shift in autonomous spending equal to
13initial foreign assets. From equations (7) and (8), we see that in the
new stationary state, the long-run equilibrium exchange rate appreciates
because (1/.80) >1+(.04/.20).Yet, the stock of foreign debt in the
new stationary state is four times the stock of foreign assets in the
original stationary state (since by assumption x =Aand net foreign
assets in the new stationary state are given by A -x/u).
The above model, while simple, usefully illustrates several key
properties of the real exchange rate. First, the current level of the
real exchange rate depends upon the expected level of the long-run real
exchange rate which is consistent with a balanced current account.
Second, autonomous spending disturbances will be expected to shift the
long-run real exchange rate. Third, if autonomous spending falls on
domestic goods, there is a presumption that the real exchange rate will
initially appreciate even if in the long run it must depreciate. Fourth,
the fact that the current account deficits associated with an autonomous
spending increase can result in a potentially large stock of foreign debt
does not necessarily imply that the long run real exchange rate must
depreciate relative to its initial equilibrium.
In sum, autonomous expenditure shifts will in general change the
expected long-run level of the real exchange rate. Shifts in autononmous
expenditure which are perceived to be permanent and which fall on
domestic goods will induce a real appreciation on impact, and may induce
a long-run real appreciation even if the current account adjustment
mechanism entails the accumulation of a substantial stock of foreign
debt.
143. Empirical Evidence on the Long Run Real Exchange Rate
One influential view of exchange rate behavior in the 1980's stresses
the importance of tight monetary policy during 1980-1982. This view uses
Dornbusch's (1976) overshooting model with sluggish price adjustment to
account for both the real dollar appreciation and high U.S. real interest
rates in the early 1980's. It gives no important role to shifts in the
long-run equilibrium real exchange rate.Sachs (1985) and Frankel
(1985) present empirical evidence supporting the notion that very little
of the real appreciation of the dollar between 1980 and early 1985 was
due to a shift in the expected long-run real exchange rate. Their
approach is to use proxies for ex ante real interest differentials on
long-term bonds to make inferences about the expected cumulative real
appreciation of the dollar over the life of the bonds. If uncovered
interest parity holds, then the market's expectation of the cumulative
real appreciation of the dollar against a particular foreign currency is
just nD nE (r -r ), where n is the number of years until nt t f,n,t us,n,t
the bonds mature and is the ex post real yield to maturity on n year
bonds denominated in the currency of country j. In practice, the
expected real yield differential is unobservable, and a proxy for the
average expected annual inflation differential over the n year interval
must be subtracted from the nominal yield differential to obtain a proxy
for the ex ante real yield differential.
Table 1 presents Frankel's (1985) estimates of the ex ante real
interest rate differential as of February 1985 on 10 year government
bonds in the U.S. and a weighted average of the other G7 countries.
Three proxies for the expected annual average inflation rate over the
15next 10 years are used, one year lagged inflation, three year distributed
lagged inflation, and a DRI forecast of inflation. As of February 1985,
nominal yields in the U.S. were 237 basis points higher than the weighted
average of foreign yields, so the nominal yield differential stood at
-237 basis points; the estimated real differential ranges from -270 to
-346 basis points. Assuming that the market expected the real exchange
rate to reach long-run equilibrium within 10 years, the real value of the
dollar relative to the other G7 countries as of February 1985 was,
according to Frankel's estimates, some 24 to 35% above its long-run real
equilibrium. Frankel concludes that, "compared with the 33 percent
logarithmic real appreciation that the weighted dollar has experienced
relative to its 1973-1979 average, ... mostof the real appreciation is
attributable to an increase in the real interest differential.
Relatively little seems attributable to a change in the long-run
equilibrium exchange rate (Frankel (1985), p.202)." Using a somewhat
different proxy -atwo-year centered moving average of actual inflation
rates -forexpected inflation over a ten year period, Sachs (1985)
reaches much the same conclusion with regards to the the real
overvaluation of the dollar relative to the mark as of the end of 1984.
These calculations are especially sensitive to errors in the measurem-
ent of the expected annual average inflation rate over the life of the
bonds. To assess the potential magnitude of this measurement error, we
recompute Frankel's estimate of the real long-term interest differential
as of February 1985 using Richard Hoey's survey of ten year U.S.
inflation expectations of financial market participants as of that date.
The results are presented in the bottom row of Table 1. According to
16Hoey's survey, U.S. financial market participants were expecting an
average annual inflation rate of 5.49% as February 1985. This is 1.33
percentage points higher than Frankel's estimate of expected U.S.
inflation using the DRI forecast and 1.95 percantage points higher than
his estimate using one-year lagged inflation. The implied ex ante real
yield on 10 year U.S. government bonds using the Hoey survey results is
6.21% compared with Frankel's estimates of between 7.54% and 8.16%. How
much of a difference does this make in calculating the overvaluation of
the dollar as of February 1985? A lower bound on the extent of
overvaluation can be obtained by subtracting Frankel's highest estimate
of the weighted average foreign real 10 year yield, 5.25%, from the U.S.
rate implied by Hoey's estimate and multiplying by 10. The result is an
estimated overvaluation of only 9.6% as of February 1985.
Thus, depending on the measure of inflationary expectations used, the
dollar was overvalued in real terms as of February 1985 by less than 10%
or more than 30%. The point of these calculations is not to criticize
any particular choice of proxies for long-term inflationary expectations,
but just to illustrate how sensitive any computation based upon expected
long-term real interest rates is to the proxy chosen. Because of this
sensitivity, no clear consensus has emerged on the extent of dollar
overvaluation in early 1985. For example, Obstfeld argued in April 1985
that
At present, long-term nominal interest differentials
between the U.S. and West Germany are roughly 200 basis
points above short-term differentials. Under the
expectations theory, this implies an expected rise in
the U.S. -WestGerman short-term real interest differential,
an expected future increase in relative U.S. inflation, or
some of each. Given the probable future evolution of
fiscal positions within the OECD, I find the expected
17inflation explanation of the current international term
structure most plausible. While the real value of the
dollar should be expected to fall, I am not convinced
that markets expect it to fall as far as its 1977 level
(Obstfeld comment on Sachs (1985)).
Clearly there is much to be gained from an alternative way to estimate
the long-run equilibrium exchange rate.
4. An Econometric Framework
In this section we develop an econometric framework which can be used
to estimate and interpret (i) the contemporaneous correlation between the
real exchange rate and the ex ante short-term real interest differential;
and (ii) the extent to which fluctuations in the real exchange rate
reflect shifts in the expected long-run real exchange rate. The
framework also provides an estimate of the correlation between
innovations in the long-run real exchange rate and in the ex ante short-
term real interest differential.
We begin with the following basic relationship:
=E[q}+ E[d] + k. (9)
Here is the natural log of the real exchange rate at the start of
period t, defined as the nominal exchange rate divided by the ratio of
the U.S. and foreign price levels. When the dollar appreciates in real
terms, falls. dtrf
-r is the ex post short-term real
interest differential, the ex post one-period real interest rate realized
on foreign assets in period t, less the ex post one-period real rate on
U.S. assets. Finally, kt is a risk premium which separates the expected
rate of real appreciation of the dollar from the ex ante real interest
18differential. When 0, equation (9) follows immediately from the
logarithmic approximation to the uncovered interest parity condition
(Cumby and Obstfeld (1984)).
Solving equation (9) forward, we obtain
w + E E[d+.] + E E[k÷.], (10)
where w is the limit as i approaches infinity of the
expectation at time t of the long-run log real exchange rate. We assume
that this limit exists (which requires, for example, that ex post real
interest differentials follow a stationary stochastic process with mean
zero). Equation (10) expresses the difference between the current and
long-run log level of the real exchange rate as the undiscounted sum of
current and expected future one-period real interest differentials plus
the undiscounted sum of current and expected future risk premia.
Absent restrictions on the time series properties ofw, Et[dJ, and
kt, equation (10) is virtually devoid of empirical content. One approach
employed by Shafer and Loopesko (1983) and Sachs (1985) is to assume that
is constant, kt —0for all t, and that a proxy for the ex ante long-
term real interest differential, Dt, exactly incorporates the
undiscounted sum of current and future short-term real interest
differentials. Under these assumptions, the following regression should
2 have an R of 1:
=w+ (11)
As discussed in detail in the previous two sections, it is quite likely
that any proxies for expected inflation used to construct the long-term
19real interest differentials are subject to measurement error and perhaps
even bias. Furthermore, on both theoretical and empirical grounds, it is
desirable to allow for shifts in the expected long-run real exchange
rate. If fluctuations in w are correlated with the real differential,
then the regression given by equation (11) cannot be used to interpret
the correlation between the the real exchange rate and the real interest
differential.
Our approach is to parameterize the dynamics of the variables in (10),
without assuming that they are observable. With parsimony in mind, we
impose the following restrictions on the unobservables w, E[d], and
the forecast error e d -E[d]:
E[d] =pE1[dti]+ v (12)
v Ae1 + u1
(13)
e u2
(14)
—w1+ u3 (15)
E[uukl 0; i,j 1,2,3; k > 1 (16)
Equation (12) restricts the ex ante one-period real differential to be a
zero mean AR(l) process with parameter p. Equation (13) expresses the
innovation to this process from the beginning of period t-1 to the
beginning of period t as the sum of two terms, a multiple .X of the
inflation surprise realized in period t-l, and an independent error u1.
Equation (14) is just the rational expectations restriction that the
inflation surprise (the difference between the ex post and ex ante real
interest differential) is white noise. Equation (15) imposes the
restriction that changes in the expected long-run real exchange rate are
20unforecastable. The innovation in w could in general depend on ei, as
the innovation in Et[dt] does, without violating this restriction (since
etl is not known until the start of period t). However for simplicity
we exclude such a correlation. (When we estimated a model leaving this
correlation free, we found little increase in likelihood, and
qualitatively similar estimates to those reported.) Finally, equation
(16) states that the vector [u1 u2 u3]' is white noise.
It should be said at the outset that the motivation for the AR(l)
specification for the ex ante real interest differential is its empirical
tractability. First, the AR(l) specification implies that the ex post
real interest differential is an ARMA(l,l) process. The parameter p is
identified from the autocorrelations of the ex post differential alone
(it is the rate at which higher-order autocorrelations decay). Second,
the AR(l) specification implies that, in the absence of a risk premium
(l/(l-p))Et[dt] +w. (17)
That is, the observable real exchange rate is a simple linear combination
of the unobservable ex ante real interest differential and the
unobservable expected long-run real exchange rate. The more persistent
is the AR(l) process for the ex ante differential, the bigger the effect
of the differential on the real exchange rate.
The AR(l) specification for the real interest differential can also be
motivated theoretically. In a world in which permanent, nominal shocks
are predominant, Dornbusch's overshooting analysis implies the
relationship given in equation (17). Furthermore, as shown in Section 2,
permanent real shocks can lead to the same linear relationship between
21the real exchange rate and the short-term real interest differential.
However, if real shocks are predominant, shifts in the expected long run
real exchange rate will also account for fluctuations in cl.
With this background, consider the following state-space model
comprised of two measurement equations
q4 =l/(l-p)0 1E[d]
1 10
wt
and three transition equations
Et[d] pA0Et1{diP u1
e
000ei +u2
w
001w1 u3
The measurement equations express the vector of two observable variables,
the real exchange rate and the ex post real interest differential, as a
linear transformation of the vector of three unobservable variables, the
ex ante real interest differential, the error in forecasting inflation
differentials, and the expected long-run real exchange rate. The
transition equations provide the law of motion for the vector of unobser-
vable variables. As discussed above, the vector of disturbances to the
transition equations is assumed to be serially uncorrelated. The three
errors have standard deviations a1, a2 and a3. The contemporaneous
covariances a12 and a23 are zero by the property of rational forecast
errors. a13 is the contemporaneous covariance between innovations in the
22expected long-run real exchange rate and innovations, unrelated to
inflation surprises, in the ex ante real interest differential; it is
left unrestricted.
The method of Kalman filtering can be used to estimate the parameters
of the state-space model. In the absence of a risk premium, there are
only two free parameters in the measurement and transition matrices, p
and A. There are four free parameters in the variance-covariance matrix
of the transition equation innovations, the three variances and the
covariance
A number of empirical studies have uncovered a time-varying risk
premium in the foreign exchange market (see Cumby (1985) for a useful
survey and extension of the literature; see Campbell and Clarida (1987)
for a recent investigation of risk premia in Euromarket term structures).
Within the context of our state-space framework, it is straightforward to
introduce an unobservable time-varying risk premium of the following
form:
—kE[d]. (18)
Equation (18) says that the risk premium, which separates the expected
rate of real appreciation from the real interest differential in favor of
foreign assets, is proportional to the ex ante real differential. As
such, it makes no statement about causality, but is merely a (very tight)
restriction on the covariance between two endogenous, unobservable
variables. Note that in the presence of a risk premium, the ex ante real
interest differential is a biased predictor of the expected rate of real
depreciation. Substituting (18) into (11),
23- E[q1] aE[dt], (19)
where a1 +k.
By assuming that the risk premium is perfectly correlated with the ex
ante real interest differential, we maintain the tractability of our
approach while allowing the real interest differential to be a biased
predictor of the expected rate of change of the real exchange rate. In
particular, maintaining our restriction that the real interest different-
ial is AR(1), equation (19) implies
=(a/(lp))E[d]+w. (20)
The requisite modification to the measurement equation is apparent.
5. Data and Empirical Results
Data on one month Eurodeposit rates and spot exchange rates against
the dollar were obtained for the U.S., Canada, the United Kingdom,
Germany, and Japan from the Harris Bank tape. Consumer price indexes for
these countries were obtained from the IFS tape. The sample period
studied was November 1979 through March 1986. Exchange rates and
interest rates were sampled on the last Friday of each month.
Real exchange rates were constructed as
1tft"us,t
(21)
where s is the nominal exchange rate in units of foreign currency per
dollar and is the ratio of foreign to U.S. CPI's. Ex post real
interest differentials were constructed by subtracting the actual
inflation differential (as measured by logarithmic changes in the country
24CPI's) over the following month from nominal one-month interest differen-
tial as of the last Friday of the preceding month. All results are
reported in units of percent per month at an annualized rate.
Table 2 displays some summary statistics for our data over the period
1979:10-1986:3. The first four columns describe the Canadian, British,
German and Japanese data respectively; the last column describes an
average formed using 1980 trade weights (Canada 46.35%, United Kingdom
12.43%, Germany 12.69% and Japan 28.53%).
The first two rows of Table 2 give the sample means and standard
deviations of real exchange rate changes over the period. The sample
means are negative, corresponding to real dollar appreciation, for all
countries except Japan. The standard deviation for Canada is about 15%
per month at an annualized rate, while for the other countries it exceeds
40%.
The next two rows of the table give the same statistics for ex post
real interest differentials. Sample means are negative for all
countries, indicating that real interest rates were higher on average in
the U.S. than abroad. Sample standard deviations range from 3% to 8%.
These statistics emphasize that real exchange rate changes have been
much more volatile than even ex post real interest differentials. A
fortiori, they have been much more volatile than ex ante differentials.
If real interest rate movements are to explain exchange rates, they must
be highly persistent so that they have a magnified effect on the exchange
rate (equation (17)), or there must be a very large risk premium effect
(equation (20)).
At the bottom of Table 2, the first six autocorrelations of the ex
25post real interest differential are reported. These were computed
assuming that the true mean of the real interest differential is zero (as
discussed in the previous section, this is an implication of our exchange
rate model and is also assumed when we estimate our state-space
representation). Similar but slightly smaller numbers are obtained when
one assumes that the sample mean differential is the true mean.
The largest autocorrelations occur for the German data. These
autocorrelations die off smoothly so that the German ex post real
interest differential looks much like an AR(l) process with coefficient
0.5 or 0.6. This is striking since we model the ex ante differential as
an AR(l) process so we expect to find more complex ARMA(l,l) behavior of
the ex post differential. The autocorrelations are smaller for the other
countries, starting at 0.25 for the U.K., 0.17 for Canada and 0.03 for
Japan. They also have a less regular pattern.
In Tables 3 -7we estimate the state space model described in the
previous section, for each currency and the trade-weighted average. In
each table we report results for a model assuming uncovered interest
parity, and for the linear risk premium model of equations (18)-(20). We
report the coefficients a, p and ) with asymptotic standard errors, the
standard deviations ,c2and of the three error terms, and the
correlation a13/c1C3. We also report some implications of these numbers:
the fractions of the variance of the ex post real interest differential
which are due to the variance of the ex ante differential and the
variance of the inflation forecast error; the fractions of the innovation
variance of the real exchange rate which are due to the innovation
variance of the ex ante differential, the innovation variance of the
26long-run equilibrium real exchange rate and the innovation covariance
between these variables; the correlation between real exchange rate
innovations and innovations in the ex ante differential and the long-run
equilibrium exchange rate; and finally, the correlation between
innovations in the ex ante differential and innovations in the long-run
equilibrium exchange rate.
The most striking feature of the results, which is robust across
currencies and the presence of a linear risk premium, is how little of
the variance of real exchange rate innovations is accounted for by
innovations in the ex ante real interest differential. When uncovered
interest parity is assumed, the estimates of the share of the ex ante
differential in real exchange rate innovation variance are particularly
small: they never exceed 9%, while the long-run equilibrium exchange rate
accounts for at least 79% and the covariance between components accounts
for the rest of the variance.
In the linear risk premium model, the ex ante differential plays a
somewhat larger role because the coefficient a is estimated larger than
one in absolute value for all countries except Japan. Thus the risk
premium amplifies the effect of the differential on the exchange rate.
Even in the risk premium model, however, the largest share of the ex ante
differential in real exchange rate innovation variance is 42% for the
trade-weighted average. The estimates for individual currencies are all
less than 27%.
The reason why we obtain these results is that we do not estimate
enough persistence in the ex ante real interest differential to overcome
the low standard deviation of the differential relative to the change in
27the exchange rate. Our estimates of p range from 0.35 to 0.81, and
higher estimates tend to be associated with a smaller share of the ex
ante differential in the variance of the ex post differential. (The ex
ante differential accounts for less than 50% of the variance of the ex
post differential except in Germany, where as noted above an AR(l) model
rather than an ARMA(l,l) model fits the ex post differential quite well).
A second striking feature of our results is that the correlation
between innovations in the long-run equilibrium real exchange rate and
innovations in the ex ante real interest differential is almost always
estimated to be positive. The one exception to this statement is the
uncovered interest parity model for Germany, which has a tiny negative
correlation of -0.04. The positive correlation implies that shocks that
have caused the expected long-run real exchange rate to appreciate have
also increased real interest rates in the U.S. relative to those abroad.
As we showed in Section 2, this pattern could result from permanent
shocks to the demand for domestic goods.
In the uncovered interest parity models, a positive shock to the ex
ante real interest differential raises the real exchange rate. In these
models, therefore, the correlation between shocks to the long-run
exchange rate and the real interest differential increases the variance
of real exchange rate innovations.
In the linear risk premium models, on the other hand, the coefficient
a is estimated to be negative for all currencies except the Canadian
dollar and the Japanese yen. A negative a corresponds to a negative
coefficient k, of absolute magnitude greater than one, in equation (18).
In words, the ex ante real interest differential and the risk premium
28move inversely, and the risk premium has a larger variance. This is
consistent with Fama's (1984) findings on the relationship between the
nominal forward premium and the risk premium. When c is negative, a
positive shock to the real differential causes the real exchange rate to
fall, so the correlation between shocks to the long-run exchange rate and
the differential reduces the variance of real exchange rate innovations.
However the real exchange rate still moves in the same direction as the
long-run equilibrium exchange rate in all the models we estimate.
Our approach relies on the assumption that the stochastic processes
driving interest rates and exchange rates are stable through time.
However changes in monetary and fiscal policies will in general alter
these processes. Clarida and Friedman (1984) have documented a shift in
the process for nominal U.S. Treasury bill rates after October 1979,
while Huizinga and Mishkin (1985) have isolated changes in the real
interest rate process in the U.S. in October 1979 and October 1982. Our
sample period starts in October 1979, so the shift at that date does not
contaminate our results. The October 1982 change is potentially more of
a problem, but when we estimate our model for the trade-weighted average
data in the post-October 1982 period, we find similar results to those
reported in the tables. The uncovered interest parity model attributes
over 95% of the variance of real exchange rate innovations to innovations
in the long-run equilibrium rate. In the linear risk premium model, the
innovations in the real interest differential and the long-run
equilibrium rate are estimated to be almost perfectly correlated.
It is well known that real exchange rate changes are largely
unpredictable (Cumby and Obstfeld (1984)), and a skeptic may argue that
29we have stacked the deck in favor of finding little explanatory power for
the ex ante real interest differential by assuming that the expected
long-run real exchange rate is a random walk. This is not the case:
observations on the ex post real interest differential, along with our
restrictions on the time series properties of the ex ante real
differential, provide independent information on the persistence and
variability of ex ante real interest differentials (Fama and Gibbons
(1982)). The Kalman filtering procedure efficiently incorporates this
information in estimating the parameters of the state-space model
(Hamilton (1985)). We conclude that over the last seven years, ex ante
real interest differentials have simply not been persistent enough, and
their innovation variance just not large enough to account for much of
the fluctuation in the dollar's real exchange rate.
6. Assessments and Conclusions
Although the methodologies and interpretations differ somewhat, our
findings are consistent with recent work by several authors. For
example, Meese and Rogoff (1985) use an instrumental variables procedure
to estimate an unrestricted version of equation (11) in difference form.
They conclude that changes in short-term real interest differentials are
not particularly successful in accounting for changes in real exchange
rates.
Our findings are also consistent with Mark's (1986) results on the
cointegration of bilateral nominal exchange rates and relative national
price levels. Mark shows that if departures from relative purchasing
power parity are transitory, then the log of the nominal exchange rate
30and the log of the ratio of the corresponding national price levels are
cointegrated. In other words, they share a common stochastic trend so
that fluctuations in the real exchange rate do not represent shifts in
the long-run real exchange rate. Using monthly data for the period June
1973 through June 1985, Mark finds no evidence of cointegration between
seven bilateral dollar exchange rates and relative national price levels.
He concludes that his evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that
permanent real shocks have accounted for much of the variability in real
exchange rates.
Our findings are also in accord with those reported by Huizinga
(1987) in this volume. In a decomposition of real exchange rate
movements into permanent and transitory components, Huizinga finds that
the permanent component accounts for between 52% and 77% of the variance
of the actual change in the real exchange rate for the bilateral exchange
rates studied in this paper. While these estimates are somewhat lower
than those reported in this paper (because Huizinga does not attempt to
identify the transitory component with real interest differentials as we
do), the results of these two papers, when taken together, provide solid
evidence that fluctuations in real exchange rates in recent years have
been dominated by shifts in the expected long-run real exchange rate.
Our results have some important implications for the analysis of
economic policy. A first set of implications concerns the decline of the
real foreign exchange value of the dollar during this decade. A second
set of implications concerns the much greater volatility of real exchange
rates since the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in the early 1970's.
If one accepts that much of the real appreciation of the dollar during
31the first half of this decade was perceived as permanent by the foreign
exchange markets, it follows that the dollar's real depreciation over the
last two years has been largely unexpected. (In fact the depreciation
has been rapid enough to surprise even someone who believed that the
dollar was substantially overvalued in early 1985; the estimates reported
by Frankel (1985) and Sachs (1985), for example, implied a gradual seven
to ten year real depreciation of the dollar at a rate of roughly three
percent per year.) Explanations of the depreciation (which continues as
of this writing) must therefore focus on previously unanticipated shifts
in policy and economic performance which have occurred over this period.
Three major shifts in U.S. policy have occurred over the last two
years. The first is a much more rapid expansion of monetary aggregates
by the Federal Reserve since early 1985. The second is the passage of
the Gramm-Rudnian-Hollings deficit reduction legislation in late 1985.
The third is the enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1986. Each one of
these policy changes has been cited as a source of the dollar's real
depreciation. We now consider each in turn.
The shift in U.S. monetary policy since early 1985 is often cited as
the principal source of the dollar's real depreciation over the last two
years, especially given its conjunction with the slowdown in real GNP
growth since the second quarter of 1984. According to the monetary-asset
market approach to exchange rate determination, a shift to more rapid
growth of the money supply relative to money demand would be expected to
induce a nominal and, in the presence of sluggish price level adjustment,
a real depreciation of the currency. The mechanism through which this
would occur is a shift in inflationary expectations. Especially in light
32of the association of the "weak" dollar during the late 1970s with
inflationary monetary policy, and the association of real appreciation
with disinflationary monetary policy during the early 1980s, the appeal
of this explanation is obvious.
However, this explanation of the dollar's real depreciation over the
last two years suffers from an important shortcoming: apart from the
depreciation of the dollar itself, there is little evidence that the
financial markets expect a resurgence in U.S. inflation. The velocity of
money has declined dramatically in tandem with the surge in money growth.
A substantial increase in money demand relative to income is not the
outcome which would be expected if inflation were anticipated to
accelerate significantly in the U.S. as a result of the monetary policy
currently being pursued. Furthermore, Hoey's survey results indicate
that long-term inflation expectations have declined steadily over the
last two years, albeit at a somewhat slower pace than the fall in long-
term U.S. interest rates and the slope of the term structure.Indeed,
as of November of 1986, the average inflation rate expected over the next
ten years by the respondents to Hoey's survey fell below 5% for the first
time since the survey began in 1978. In sum, while a sustained increase
in money growth would, on the basis of both theoretical research and
historical experience, be expected to result in a real depreciation of
the dollar, the behavior of velocity, long-term interest rates, and
surveys of long-term inflation expectations cast doubt on this as the
sole explanation of the dollar's real depreciation since early 1985.
The link between budget deficits and the real exchange rate is perhaps
the most disputed policy question of the decade. In 1983 and 1984, the
33federal government ran record peacetime budget deficits and the dollar
appreciated in real terms. In 1985 and 1986, the budget deficits
exceeded those recorded in 1983 and 1984 and the dollar depreciated in
real terms back to its 1982 level. Of course, the exchange rate is an
asset price which reflects not only current, but prospective, budget
deficits as well as the means by which they are to be financed. We have
already discussed the evidence against the view that the real
depreciation of the dollar reflects the expectation of a resurgence in
U.S. inflation resulting from monetization. An alternative to this view
is that the passage of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings legislation in late 1985
signaled to the financial markets the prospect of significant deficit
reduction by the end of the decade. According to this argument, the
dollar depreciated because of the expectation of deficit reduction and a
decline in government spending on domestic goods in the future, despite
record budget deficits in the present.
A potential shortcoming with this argument is that the empirical
results presented in Section 5 show a positive correlation between the
current and long-run real exchange rate. Such a correlation is not
consistent with the budget deficit account of the dollar's real
appreciation if deficits were perceived to be transitory during the first
half of the decade. In the simple theoretical model outlined in Section
2, a transitory fiscal deficit -inthe absence of offsetting increases
in private saving -canbe shown to result in a long-run real
depreciation. This is because, in the absence of a permanent autonomous
increase in demand for domestic goods, the export surplus required to
service the outstanding stock of foreign debt accumulated during the
34current account adjustment process requires a long-run real depreciation
which shifts foreign demand toward domestic goods which are in excess
supply. This point is discussed in more detail in Obstfeld (1985).
If budget deficits were perceived to be permanent in the early 1980's,
this objection does not apply. The theoretical model outlined in Section
2 is too simple to be used to assess this possibility formally because it
abstracts from economic growth, and thus the possibility of stabilizing
the debt to output ratio in the context of a permanent fiscal deficit.
Nevertheless, the budget deficit-real exchange rate link cannot be ruled
out as one potential source of the dollar's real depreciation over the
last two years.
The final major shift in U.S. policy since early 1985 is the enactment
of the Tax Reform Act in 1986. According to estimates compiled by the
Council of Economic Advisers (1987), tax reform, on net, will increase
the cost of capital despite a lowering of the corporate tax rate,
primarily because of the elimination of the investment tax credit. It
has been argued that the surge in investment spending during the first
three years of the current economic expansion and the appreciation of the
dollar which occured through early 1985 were largely due to the increase
in the after-tax profitability of investment resulting from the Economic
Recovery Tax Act of 1981. The appreciation of the long-run real exchange
rate during the first half of the decade is consistent with this view and
the theoretical model model presented in Section 2. According to the
logic of this argument, an increase in the cost of capital resulting from
tax reform would be expected to reduce investment spending and depreciate
both the current and long-run equilibrium level of the real exchange
35rate. Again this is consistent with the empirical results and the
theoretical discussion.
The second implication of the results of this paper concerns the
increase in real exchange rate volatility since the collapse of fixed
exchange rates in the early 1970s. Mussa (1986) documents that, for
pairs of countries with similar and moderate inflation rates, the real
exchange rate typically shows much more short term volatility under
floating rates than under fixed rates.
Mussa's interpretation of this result is that commitment to policies
consistent with the maintenance of fixed nominal exchange rates plays a
critical role in stabilizing the behavior of real exchange rates under
the fixed-rate regime. According to this view, so long as agents believe
that this commitment will be fulfilled, they need not worry about the
implications of short-run variations in policy variables or other
economic disturbances for the appropriate level of the nominal exchange
rate. By contrast, under floating rates agents must continually revise
their expectations of the future behavior of government policy in forming
their expectations. The continual revision of expectations imparts to
the nominal exchange rate its asset price properties. If national price
levels respond less rapidly to new information than do nominal exchange
rates, the volatility of the latter is transmitted to the real exchange
rate.
The findings of this paper broaden our understanding of this result.
For if real exchange rates are not only more volatile, but if their
movements are largely expected to be permanent, then fluctuations in real
exchange rates under a floating exchange rate regime are potentially more
36costly to private agents than would be the case if large fluctuations
were rationally expected to be soon reversed.
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39Table 1
Estimates of Real Long-Term Interest Differentials -February1985
Weighted -averageof
Item U.S. other G7 countries Differential
Long- term
govt. bond rate 11.70 9.33 -2.37
one-year lagged 3.54 4.07
inflation
est. real rate 8.16 5.25 -2.90
distrib. lag of 3.83 4.92
inflation
est. real rate 7.87 4.41 -3.46
DRI forecast 4.16 4.49
inflation
est. real rate 7.54 4.84 -2.70
Hoey survey of 5.49
inflation
est. real rate 6.21 5.25* -0.96*
All but the last two rows of table are from Frankel (1985), P. 200. The
survey of ten year U.S. inflation expectations are from Hoey (1986).
*Frankel's maximum estimate of the average long-term real rate in the
other G7 countries. Thus the difference between the U.S. real rate
implied by Hoey's survey, 6.21, and Frankel's maximum average foreign
rate, 5.25, gives a lower bound of 0.96 on the absolute value of the real
differential in February 1985.
40Table 2
Summary Statistics, 1979:10-1986:3
Statistic Country
Canada U.K. Germany Japan Trade-Weighted
Average
Mean
change in real
exchange rate -1.380-3.823 -5.200 1.542 -1.335
Standard
deviation of
change in real
exchange rate 15.19744.909 42.783 43.954 23.139
Mean real
interest
differential -0.890 -1.233 -2.390 -1.793 -1.381
Standard
deviation of
ex post real
interest
differential 4.522 7.503 3.609 8.167 3.592
Correlation of
change in real
exchange rate and
ex post real
interest
differential -0.191-0.172 0.004 -0.112 -0.069
Auto correlations
of ex post real
interest
differential:
1 0.165 0.251 0.657 0.034 0.329
2 -0.105 0.034 0.388 -0.169 0.111
3 0.028 0.052 0.233 -0.123 -0.001
4 0.144-0.054 0.075 0.133 0.035
5 0.035 0.033 0.165 0.174 0.278
6 -0.047 0.036 0.278 0.176 0.353
41Table 3
Real Interest Differentials and Exchange Rates -Canada1979:10-1986:3
Uncovered interest parity model:
Log likelihood 544.33
Parameters a 1.00 (fixed)
p 0.35 (0.45)
A-0.10(0.31)
a1 2.85
a2
3.34
a313.64
a13,'a1a3
0.11
Variance decomposition for ex post real interest differential:
Ex ante real interest differential 45.7%
Inflation innovations 54.3%
Variance decomposition for real exchange rate innovations:
Innovations in ex ante real interest differential 9.0%
Innovations in long-run equilibrium exchange rate 84.7%
Covariance 6.3%
Correlation between innovations in:
Real exchange rate and ex ante differential 0.40
Real exchange rate and long-run equilibrium rate 0.95
Ex ante differential and long-run equilibrium rate 0.11
Linear risk premium model:
Log likelihood 544.37
Parameters a 1.61 (1.57)
p 0.35 (0.45)
A -0.04 (0.20)
a1 2.35
a2
3.77
a312.64
a13/c1a3 0.13
Variance decomposition for ex post real interest differential:
Ex ante real interest differential 30.8%
Inflation innovations 69.2%
Variance decomposition for real exchange rate innovations:
Innovations in ex ante real interest differential 15.9%
Innovations in long-run equilibrium exchange rate 75.1%
Covariance 8.9%
Correlation between innovations in:
Real exchange rate and ex ante differential 0.51
Real exchange rate and long-run equilibrium rate 0.92
Ex ante differential and long-run equilibrium rate 0.13
42Table 4
Real Interest Differentials and Exchange Rates -U.K.1979:10-1986:3
Uncovered interest parity model:
Log likelihood 425.25
Parameters a 1.00 (fixed)
p 0.69 (0.22)
A -0.49 (0.65)
01 2.74
02
0340.03
013/101030.37
Variance decomposition for ex post real interest differential:
Ex ante real interest differential 49.1%
Inflation innovations 50.9%
Variance decomposition for real exchange rate innovations:
Innovations in ex ante real interest differential 7.5%
Innovations in long-run equilibrium exchange rate 79.3%
Covariance 13.2%
Correlation between innovations in:
Real exchange rate and ex ante differential 0.52
Real exchange rate and long-run equilibrium rate 0.96
Ex ante differential and long-run equilibrium rate 0.27
Linear risk premium model:
Log likelihood 426.39
Parameters a-2.41 (2.77)
p 0.81 (0.21)
A0.09(0.13)
1.48
027.10
0362.06
013/0103 1.00
Variance decomposition for ex post real interest differential:
Ex ante real interest differential 13.1%
Inflation innovations 86.9%
Variance decomposition for real exchange rate innovations:
Innovations in ex ante real interest differential 21.4%
Innovations in long-run equilibrium exchange rate 197.8%
Covariance -119.2%
Correlation between innovations in:
Real exchange rate and ex ante differential 0.83
Real exchange rate and long-run equilibrium rate 0.98
Ex ante differential and long-run equilibrium rate 0.92
43Table 5
Real Interest Differentials and Exchange Rates -Germany1979:10-1986:3
Uncovered interest parity model:
Log likelihood 488.52
Parameters a 1.00 (fixed)
p 0.58 (0.12)
A 8.48 (****)
a1
0.26
a2
0.40
a342.92
-0.59
Variance decomposition for ex post real interest differential:
Ex ante real interest differential 99.1%
Inflation innovations 0.9%
Variance decomposition for real exchange rate innovations:
Innovations in ex ante real interest differential 3.5%
Innovations in long-run equilibrium exchange rate 98.2%
Covariance -1.6%
Correlation between innovations in:
Real exchange rate and ex ante differential 0.14
Real exchange rate and long-run equilibrium rate 0.98
Ex ante differential and long-run equilibrium rate -0.04
Linear risk premium model:
Log likelihood 491.49
Parameters a -3.26 (1.61)
p 0.51 (0.15)
A 1.07(0.53)
a1 2.21
a2
2.13
a346.07
a13/a1a3 0.65
Variance decomposition for ex post real interest differential:
Ex ante real interest differential 75.0%
Inflation innovations 25.0%
Variance decomposition for real exchange rate innovations:
Innovations in ex ante real interest differential 26.7%
Innovations in long-run equilibrium exchange rate 125.9%
Covariance -52.6%
Correlation between innovations in:
Real exchange rate and ex ante differential -0.01
Real exchange rate and long-run equilibrium rate 0.89
Ex ante differential and long-run equilibrium rate 0.45
44Table 6
Real Interest Differentials and Exchange Rates -Japan1979:10-1986:3
Uncovered interest parity model:
Log likelihood 415.98
Parameters a 1.00 (fixed)
p 0.73 (0.34)
A -0.18 (0.29)
1.94
a2 7.58
39.41
0.50
Variance decomposition for ex post real interest differential:
Ex ante real interest differential 17.3%
Inflation innovations 82.7%
Variance decomposition for real exchange rate innovations:
Innovations in ex ante real interest differential 4.0%
Innovations in long-run equilibrium exchange rate 81.1%
Covariance 14.8%
Correlation between innovations in:
Real exchange rate and ex ante differential 0.57
Real exchange rate and long-run equilibrium rate 0.98
Ex ante differential and long-run equilibrium rate 0.41
Linear risk premium model:
Log likelihood 416.14
Parameters a 0.41 (2.15)
p 0.77 (0.35)
A -0.49 (3.69)
0.97
02 6.56
41.50
1.00
Variance decomposition for ex post real interest differential:
Ex ante real interest differential 38.3%
Inflation innovations 61.7%
Variance decomposition for real exchange rate innovations:
Innovations in ex ante real interest differential 1.8%
Innovations in long-run equilibrium exchange rate 90.8%
Covariance 7.4%
Correlation between innovations in:
Real exchange rate and ex ante differential 0.41
Real exchange rate and long-run equilibrium rate 0.99
Ex ante differential and long-run equilibrium rate 0.29
45Table 7
Real Interest Differentials and Exchange Rates -TradeWeighted Average
1979:10-1986:3
Uncovered interest parity model:
Log likelihood 527.31
Parameters a 1.00 (fixed)
p 0.66 (0.23)
A-0.18(0.45)
a1 1.80
a2 2.79
a321.27
c113,'a1a30.24
Variance decomposition for ex post real interest differential:
Ex ante real interest differential 44.3%
Inflation innovations 55.7%
Variance decomposition for real exchange rate innovations:
Innovations in ex ante real interest differential 5.6%
Innovations in long-run equilibrium exchange rate 84.2%
Covariance 10.2%
Correlation between innovations in:
Real exchange rate and ex ante differential 0.45
Real exchange rate and long-run equilibrium rate 0.97
Ex ante differential and long-run equilibrium rate 0.23
Linear risk premium model:
Log likelihood 529.23
Parameters a-2.72 (1.74)
p 0.79 (0.20)
A 0.09(0.12)
a1
1.09
a2
3.33
a330.73
0.76
Variance decomposition for ex post real interest differential:
Ex ante real interest differential 23.3%
Inflation innovations 76.7%
Variance decomposition for real exchange rate innovations:
Innovations in ex ante real interest differential 42.2%
Innovations in long-run equilibrium exchange rate 187.6%
Covariance -129. 7%
Correlation between innovations in:
Real exchange rate and ex ante differential 0.35
Real exchange rate and long-run equilibrium rate 0.90
Ex ante differential and long-run equilibrium rate 0.73
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